University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
Volume 53

Number 1

Article 8

12-13-2021

Legal and Ethical Implications of U.S. and Canadian Vaccine
Contracts: The Impact of Vaccine Nationalism on the Global
Pandemic Response
Ryan S. Tahiri
University of Miami School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Marketing Law
Commons

Recommended Citation
Ryan S. Tahiri, Legal and Ethical Implications of U.S. and Canadian Vaccine Contracts: The Impact of
Vaccine Nationalism on the Global Pandemic Response, 53 U. MIA Inter-Am. L. Rev. 231 ()
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol53/iss1/8

This Student Note/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami
School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-American Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information,
please contact library@law.miami.edu.

Legal and Ethical Implications of U.S.
and Canadian Vaccine Contracts: The
Impact of Vaccine Nationalism on the
Global Pandemic Response
Ryan S. Tahiri *
This note explores the COVID-19 vaccine contracts between
the U.S. and Canada and the impact of these types of agreements on the global pandemic response. These “pre-purchases,” many of which were executed before the development of a vaccine, have afforded a select few nations the opportunity to stockpile vaccines, while other nations with
fewer resources are unable to secure any doses. An effective
method to counter the effects of the pandemic is the creation
of a global vaccine network that provides equitable access
to vaccine doses for nations in need. COVAX was launched
to ensure that lower and middle-income nations have the opportunity to purchase vaccine doses at reduced costs for
their respective populations. This initiative offers a realistic
solution to shortening the timeline of the COVID-19 pandemic and bringing the global population closer to herd immunity.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 9, 2020, when the World Health Organization
(WHO) announced the arrival of the novel coronavirus (“COVID–
19”) in Wuhan, China, few could have predicted the trajectory of the
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pandemic. 1 As COVID–19’s case count grew exponentially and the
global death toll began to spike, the WHO declared the COVID–19
pandemic a public health emergency. 2 Shortly after, the United
States government followed suit and declared the COVID–19 pandemic a public health emergency. 3 In March 2020, President Trump
declared the COVID–19 pandemic a national emergency, which
triggered the release of billions of dollars to be funneled towards
fighting the virus and researching a cure. 4 Countries across the
world have struggled to contain and respond to the health and economic effects of the COVID–19 pandemic, as it is the first health
crisis of this magnitude in over a century, the last of which dates
back to the arrival of the Spanish flu in 1918. 5
As part of its pandemic response, the U.S. began funding large
pharmaceutical companies in an effort to develop a COVID–19 vaccine. 6 These companies, including Pfizer, Moderna, Johnson &
Johnson, and Novavax, are all based in the U.S. and have received
upwards of $9 billion for research and development. 7 The U.S. government has provided billions of dollars in funding to U.S. pharmaceutical companies as part of “Operation Warp Speed,” 8 an operation dedicated to successfully developing, manufacturing, and distributing 300 million vaccine doses by January 2021. 9 Agreements
between the federal government and U.S. pharmaceutical
A Timeline of COVID–19 Developments in 2020, AJMC,
https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020 (last
updated Jan. 1, 2021).
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Mark Terry, Compare:1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Versus COVID–19,
BIOSPACE (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.biospace.com/article/compare-1918spanish-influenza-pandemic-versus-covid-19/.
6
Karen Weintraub & Elizabeth Weise, Federal spending on COVID_19
vaccine candidates tops $9 billion, spread among 7 companies, USA
TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2020/08/08/fedsspending-more-than-9-billion-covid-19-vaccine candidates/5575206002/
(last updated Aug. 10, 2020, 9:32 AM).
7
Id.
8
Explaining Operation Warp Speed, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
https://health.mo.gov/living/healthcondiseases/communicable/novel-coronavirus-lpha/pdf/fact-sheet-operation-warp-speed.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2021)
[hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.].
9
Id.
1
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companies stipulate that the U.S. would receive the first batch of
doses produced. 10 For example, the U.S. and Pfizer agreed that the
U.S. would receive the first 100 million doses, with the option to
acquire an additional 500 million. 11 The federal government included this provision in every vaccine contract with U.S. manufacturers to ensure the initial batches of vaccine doses were prioritized
for U.S. residents. 12 Certainly, this favorable agreement is linked to
the U.S.’s predominant role in vaccine funding. 13 Providing $11 billion to pharmaceutical companies in the first months of the pandemic, the U.S.’s financial contributions to the vaccine race are unparalleled. 14 Without this significant level of U.S. funding, manufacturers could have opted to sell the vaccines to nations that offered
higher prices. 15
U.S. pharmaceutical companies have also entered into contracts to supply vaccine doses to Canada, among other countries. 16
The Canadian government committed over $1 billion in future vaccine contracts with several pharmaceutical companies, including
Moderna, Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson, and Novavax. 17 These contracts included up–front costs followed by incremental payments
throughout the development process, which were contingent upon
the successful completion of clinical trials and regulatory approval. 18 By entering into these future agreements with

Noah Weiland, Denise Grady & David E. Sanger, Pfizer Gets $1.95 Billion to
Produce Coronavirus Vaccine by Year’s End, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/us/politics/pfizer-coronavirus-vaccine.html (last updated
Nov. 10, 2020).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Richard G. Frank, Leslie Dach, & Nicole Lurie, It Was The Government That
Produced COVID–19 Vaccine Success, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 14, 2021),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210512.191448/full/.
14
James C. Robinson, Funding of Pharmaceutical Innovation During and After
the COVID-19 Pandemic, JAMA (Jan. 14, 2021), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2775400.
15
Weiland, supra note 10.
16
Procuring vaccines for COVID–19, GOV’T OF CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/public-services-procurement/services/procuring-vaccinescovid19.html (last updated Oct. 7, 2021).
17
Id.
18
Id.
10
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manufacturers, the Canadian government effectively secured priority access to potential vaccine doses for its residents. 19
This article will begin by addressing the recently executed
COVID–19 vaccine agreements between the Canadian government
and U.S. pharmaceutical companies, and comparing these new
agreements to previous vaccine agreements between U.S. pharmaceutical companies and foreign states. Part II of this article will lay
out the relevant legal frameworks surrounding previous pandemic
responses and future vaccine contracts. Part III of this article will
then explore the contractual relationships between the U.S. federal
government, the Canadian government, and U.S. pharmaceutical
companies to dissect potential business and legal implications. Following that, Part IV will focus on the various ethical issues raised
by these types of vaccine agreements, such as vaccine nationalism
and the limited liability of vaccine manufacturers. Part V of this paper will discuss the effect of these agreements on the global pandemic response and explore alternatives to these types of agreements for future crises. Finally, Part VI will explore the various alternatives to bilateral vaccine contracts—including vaccine alliances, Advanced Market Commitment Models, and multilateral
agreements—that provide equitable access to vaccines for lower and
middle–income countries, comparing and contrasting the different
approaches to the pandemic response, and offering insight on how
to respond to future public health crises.
To shorten the timeline of the COVID–19 pandemic, countries should continue implementing a coordinated, global response.
The creation of a global vaccine network is an integral component
to providing equitable access to COVID–19 vaccines and mitigating
the effects of the pandemic.
II.
BACKGROUND
In the event of a public health emergency in the U.S., the Public
Health Service (“PHS”) Act grants the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) the power to make critical decisions in an
effort to address and mitigate the emergency situation. 20 The PHS
Id.
Regulations and Laws That May Apply During a Pandemic, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic19
20
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Act serves as the basis for the HHS’ authority by permitting “the
HHS Secretary to take key actions, such as lead all federal public
health and medical response, declare a public health emergency, assist states in meeting health emergencies, maintain the Strategic National Stockpile, and control communicable diseases.” 21
On February 4, 2020, Alex Azar, the Secretary of the HHS, issued a Declaration pursuant to the PHS Act “to provide liability immunity for activities related to medical countermeasures against
COVID–19.” 22 The HHS stated that when a Declaration under the
PHS Act is in effect, “the [PHS] Act precludes, for example, liability
claims alleging negligence by a manufacturer in creating a vaccine,
or negligence by a health care provider in prescribing the wrong
dose, absent willful misconduct.” 23 The threshold to reach “willful
misconduct” is high, as it requires that “the covered person act (i)
intentionally to achieve a wrongful purpose; (ii) knowingly without
legal or factual justification; and (iii) in disregard of a known or obvious risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that the harm
will outweigh the benefit.” 24 As expected, this immunity provision
does not cover actions grounded in “willful misconduct,” yet it covers actions of negligence, even in vaccine development. 25 The PHS
Act likely included this liability shield provision to incentivize manufacturers to develop vaccines in an expeditious and efficient manner. 26 Regardless of the intention, this provision acts as a de facto
absolute immunity status for vaccine manufacturers. 27 Given the unlikelihood of a manufacturer engaging in willful misconduct while
developing a vaccine, there are few legal recourses for individuals
harmed by a newly–developed COVID–19 vaccine. 28
Manufacturers may point to the assumption of risk doctrine, as
the patient waives certain legal remedies as a prerequisite to
resources/planning-preparedness/regulations-laws-during-pandemic.htm (last
updated Nov. 3, 2016).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 20.
27
Id.
28
Id.
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obtaining the vaccine. 29 Given the novelty and unprecedented timeline of vaccine development, there is no guarantee as to the effects
of the vaccine. 30 Without inserting a waiver and assumption of risk
provision in the vaccine contracts, manufacturers would find themselves in a vulnerable position that would likely open the floodgates
of litigation. 31
In Canada, the federal government’s public health power comes
from several sources. 32 The first source is the power to quarantine
pursuant to Canada’s Constitution Act. 33 Under Section 91 of the
Constitution Act, “the federal government derives its jurisdiction to
directly or indirectly regulate on public health–related issues principally from its powers to legislate on quarantine.” 34 Further, the Constitution Act provides the federal government with the power to
make laws “for the peace, order and good government of Canada.” 35
Two laws have been passed that specifically address the federal government’s emergency powers. 36 The first, the 2007 Emergency
Management Act, provides a framework to assist provinces in the
event of an emergency and to coordinate responsive actions between
the federal government and provinces. 37
The second piece of legislation, The Emergencies Act of 1985,
provides the federal government authority to declare a national
emergency and act unilaterally. 38 This Act grants the federal government more power than the 2007 Emergency Management Act in
that the government is not required to collaborate with the provinces
in crafting an emergency response. 39 However, questions arise
Id.
Id.
31
Id.
32
Amy Swiffen, The limits of Canada’s federal emergency law during the coronavirus pandemic, THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 1, 2020, 10:27 AM),
https://theconversation.com/the-limits-of-canadas-federal-emergency-law-during-the-coronavirus-pandemic-134309.
33
Id.
34
Legal Responses to Health Emergencies, LIBRARY OF CONG. 39 (Feb. 2015),
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/llglrd/2014504236/2014504236.pdf.
35
Swiffen, supra note 32.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
29
30
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surrounding the effectiveness of these laws given that the federal
government may take action only after the effects of the pandemic
have surpassed the provincial response capacities. 40
A.

Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP)

1. History
The Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (“PIP”) Framework is the
sole international legal tool regarding equitable vaccine distribution. 41 The PIP Framework was adopted in 2011 to apply a global
approach to influenza pandemics, and governs all 194 member states
of the WHO. 42
2. Objectives
The objectives of the PIP Framework are to “improve and
strengthen the sharing of influenza viruses with human pandemic
potential; and to increase the access of developing countries to vaccines and other pandemic related supplies.” 43 Pursuant to this framework, the WHO seeks to organize influenza vaccine distribution to
countries that have obtained vaccine contracts with manufacturers. 44
The vaccine rollout under PIP is typically affected by countries’ respective health needs. 45 However, given the global impact of the
COVID–19 pandemic, vaccine doses are in high demand in virtually
every country worldwide. 46 Vaccines, as a result, have been distributed based on priority access rather than on a need basis. 47
Id.
Alexandra L. Phelan, Mark Eccleston–Turner, Michelle Rourke, Allan
Maleche & Chenguang Wang, Legal agreements: barriers and enablers to
global equitable COVID–19 vaccine access, THE LANCET (Sept. 7, 2020),
https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(20)318730/fulltext.
42
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework, WHO,
https://www.who.int/initiatives/pandemic-influenza-preparedness-framework
(last visited Oct. 3, 2021) [hereinafter PIP Framework].
43
Id.
44
Phelan et al., supra note 41.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Jennifer Tolbert, Jennifer Kates, & Josh Michaud, The COVID–19 Vaccine
Priority Line Continues to Change as States Make Further Updates, KFF (Jan.
40
41
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COVID–19 Law Lab

1. History
Due to the novel nature of the global COVID–19 pandemic, a
perfect international legal framework has not yet been put in place. 48
But despite the fact that there is no universal legal instrument specific to COVID–19, the majority of countries worldwide are bound
under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”). 49 Pursuant to this agreement, member nations
must “take steps, individually and through international assistance,
to realise the right to health and the right to enjoy the benefits of
scientific research and its applications, without discrimination.” 50
Taking steps to realize these rights would likely translate to ensuring
equitable availability and access for member countries. 51 Although
the PIP Framework is the sole legal precedent for international vaccine distribution, it has yet to apply to a pandemic of this magnitude. 52 To counter the effects of the COVID–19 pandemic, the
United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”), WHO, the
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and the
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health at Georgetown University collaborated in July 2020 to develop the COVID–19 Law
Lab. 53
2. Objectives
The COVID–19 Law Lab is a collection of legal documents and
resources from more than 190 countries worldwide compiled to aid
countries in implementing legal frameworks to control the pandemic. 54 The COVID–19 Law Lab is based off of the work of the
UHC Legal Solutions Network, an entity that was created to assist
21, 2021), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/the-covid-19-vaccine-priority-linecontinues-to-change-as-states-make-further-updates/.
48
Phelan et al., supra note 41.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
About the Collaboration, COVID–19 L. LAB, https://covidlawlab.org/aboutthe-collaboration/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2021).
54
Id.
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countries in “achiev[ing] universal health coverage through the implementation of rights–based legal frameworks.” 55 The principal objective of this initiative is to provide a framework for countries to
safeguard the health of residents, while adhering to international human rights standards. 56 The project also aims to help countries evaluate and improve upon their current legal and public health systems. 57 Following the launch of this initiative, countries now have
access to an expansive database of legal frameworks and are in a
position to reform legislation, particularly on the subject of vaccine
development and approval. 58
C.

Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs)

1. History
Advance Purchase Agreements (“APAs”) are “pre–purchases”
of vaccines that have not yet been developed or approved for the
general public. 59 Through this legal instrument, a country pledges to
purchase a fixed amount or a percentage of future vaccine doses
from a vaccine manufacturer, pending research and development,
public health approval, licensing, manufacturing, and distribution. 60
The U.S. government entered into APAs with multiple pharmaceutical companies, including Pfizer and Novavax, among others. 61 The
federal government typically does not execute APAs with pharmaceutical companies, as public insurers and the private sector typically purchase vaccine doses. 62 However, given the urgent need for

New COVID–19 Law Lab to provide legal information and support for
COVID-19 response, SECURITY (July 28, 2020), https://www.securitymagazine.com/articles/92934-new-covid-19-law-lab-to-provide-legal-informationand support-for-covid-19-response.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Nicholson Price, Rachel Sachs, Jacob S. Sherkow & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette,
Covid–19 Vaccine Advance Purchases Explained, HARVARD L. SCHOOL BILL OF
HEALTH (Aug. 11, 2020), https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/11/covid19-vaccine-advance-purchases-explained/.
60
Phelan et al., supra note 41.
61
Price et al., supra note 59.
62
Id.
55
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COVID–19 vaccinations across the U.S., the federal government
has assumed control of the allocation and distribution process. 63
2. Objectives
APAs offer numerous benefits to both the participating country
and the vaccine manufacturer. 64 By securing COVID–19 vaccine
doses ahead of time, countries have helped mitigate the significant
health and economic costs posed by the pandemic. 65 And although
purchasing a vaccine that has not yet been developed was inherently
risky, this practice accelerated each stage of the typical vaccine
timeline, from production to distribution. 66 Some studies have
shown that, even under a conservative analysis, the net benefit of
investments in potential COVID–19 vaccines is substantial. 67 One
study estimates that investing in one vaccine manufacturer to vaccinate 20% of a country’s population would cost the investing country $2.6 billion, yet provide $8.7 billion in benefits. 68 The net gain
of $6.1 billion is realized through avoiding significant health costs,
such as medical care related to COVID–19 and economic costs—
the investment has allowed countries to reopen the economy and allow industries to recover from the pandemic. 69 Applying the previous example on a larger scale, investing in three candidates to vaccinate 60% of the population would cost $19 billion, yet provide $35
billion in benefits, rendering a net gain of $16 billion. 70 Another
Id.
Arthur Baker, Juan Camilo Castillo, Greg Larson, Alex Tabarrok & Brandon
Tan, 3 reasons why countries should purchase COVID–19 vaccines at risk,
INTER–AM. DEV. BANK (Nov. 9, 2020), https://blogs.iadb.org/salud/en/countries-covid-19-vaccines/.
65
Richard G. Frank, Leslie Dach, & Nicole Lurie, It Was The Government That
Produced COVID–19 Vaccine Success, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 14, 2021),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210512.191448/full/.
66
Baker et al., supra note 64.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Joseph E. Gagnon, Steven Kamin, & John Kearns, Economic costs and benefits of accelerated COVID–19 vaccinations, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON.
(May 2021), https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/economic-costsand-benefits-accelerated-covid-19-vaccinations (“[A] faster pace of vaccination
that hastens the end of the pandemic by 10 months would lead to an additional
$970 billion in world GDP.”).
70
Baker et al., supra note 64.
63
64
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benefit of APAs is that the urgency and competition inherent in the
race to develop a novel COVID–19 vaccine oftentimes drives innovation and leads to a more efficient method of vaccine development
for future crises. 71
However, critics of APAs have argued that these legal tools only
benefit developed countries with sufficient financial resources to secure COVID–19 vaccine doses, and only serve to act as a barrier for
developing countries to obtain vaccines. 72 It is argued that the execution of APAs between developed countries and vaccine manufacturers may serve as an obstacle to global equitable access to vaccines. 73 Moreover, bilateral APAs, while beneficial for the countries
involved, arguably widen existing inequities between developed and
developing countries and continue to extend the timeline of the pandemic. 74
III.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF VACCINE AGREEMENTS

A.
Contracts Between the U.S. and U.S. Pharmaceutical
Companies
To expedite the development and distribution of a COVID–19
vaccine, the U.S. government initiated Operation Warp Speed in
May 2020. 75 The objective of this operation was to produce and distribute 300 million vaccine doses by January 2021. 76 The standard
timeline for vaccine development, from research and development
to distribution, is roughly six years. 77 However, by accelerating each
component of the process, Operation Warp Speed aims to develop a
vaccine in an unprecedented timeline of 14 months. 78 This accelerated approach involves the collaboration of multiple government
agencies, including the HHS, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”), the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”),
the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), and the Department of
Price et al., supra note 59.
Phelan et al., supra note 41.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS, supra note 8.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
71
72
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Defense (“DOD”), among others. 79 The federal government has thus
far executed vaccine agreements with the following companies: Novavax, Johnson & Johnson, Moderna, and Pfizer. 80
Under its agreement with the U.S., Novavax would secure
roughly $1.7 billion in U.S. funding to develop a COVID–19 vaccine. 81 In return, the government, specifically the HHS and DOD,
would receive the first 100 million doses produced by Novavax, 82
and U.S. residents would receive the vaccine at no cost. 83 One potential area of concern with this agreement was the fact that the
agreement between the federal government and Novavax was brokered by a third party, Advanced Technology International. 84 Typically, these types of agreements are negotiated directly between the
manufacturer and the federal government without an external
party. 85 The government has expressed concerns surrounding the involvement of a third party in the agreement, particularly toward the
potential exclusion of safeguards, including those that counter
price–gouging. 86 However, to circumvent this provision, the government may technically opt to “march–in” and exercise its powers
of eminent domain. 87 The Johnson & Johnson agreement is similar
to Novavax’s. The Johnson & Johnson contract with the U.S. was
valued at just over $1 billion and provided that the U.S. would receive the first 100 million doses of its vaccine. 88 Like the Novavax
See id.
Id.
81
Novavax COVID–19 Vaccine Granted Fast Track Designation by U.S. FDA,
NOVAVAX (Nov. 9, 2020), https://ir.novavax.com/2020-11-09-NovavaxCOVID-19-Vaccine-Granted-Fast-Track-Designation-by-U-S-FDA.
82
HHS, DOD Collaborate with Novavax to Produce Millions of COVID-19 Investigational Vaccine Doses in Commercial–Scale Manufacturing Demonstration Projects, U.S. DEP’T. DEF. (Jul. 7, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2310955/hhs-dod-collaborate-with-novavax-toproduce-millions-of-covid-19-investigationa/.
83
Id.
84
Sydney Lupkin, Novavax Posts Coronavirus Vaccine Contract That Government Didn’t Disclose, NPR (Nov. 11, 2020, 1:10 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/11/11/933864908/novavax posts-coronavirus-vaccinecontract-that-government-didnt-disclose.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
79
80
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agreement, the Johnson & Johnson contract was brokered by a third
party and omitted typical protections such as those safeguarding
against price–gouging. 89
The U.S.’s agreements with the remaining vaccine companies
are also worth examining. U.S. government and Moderna reached
an agreement where the U.S. would provide $1.5 billion to develop
a vaccine. 90 In exchange, the government received the first 100 million vaccine doses, with an option to purchase an additional 400 million. 91 Unlike the government’s previous agreements, the agreement
with Moderna remains largely undisclosed to the public. 92 However,
it does include a similar “march–in” clause for the government to
assume control of the vaccine if Moderna does not make it “reasonably” available. 93 Moderna’s agreement can be compared with
Pfizer’s—pursuant to its agreement with the U.S., Pfizer would receive $1.95 billion in funding to distribute a COVID–19 vaccine. 94
However, Pfizer is the sole company that refused to accept federal
funding in the research and development stage, opting instead to receive funding for distribution purposes. 95 Pfizer reasoned that federal funding would have delayed the vaccine’s path to clinical trials. 96 Unlike the other agreements, the agreement with Pfizer provided that the first 100 million doses would be produced before the
end of 2020. 97 Once this occurred, the federal government was able
to exercise the option to secure up to 500 million more doses. 98

Id.
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Weiland et al., supra note 10.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Ankur Banerjee & Vishwadha Chander, Pfizer, U.S. strike 100 million
COVID–19 vaccine deal with 70 million due by June, REUTERS (Dec. 23,
2020, 7:10 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usapfizer-idUSKBN28X1GC (“[T]he company halved its 2020 production target
due to manufacturing issues…”).
98
Pfizer And BioNTech To Provide 500 Million Doses of COVID–19 Vaccine To
U.S. Government For Donation To Poorest Nations, PFIZER (June 10, 2021, 2:00
AM), https://www.pfizer.com/news/press-release/press-release-detail/pfizerand-biontech-provide-500-million-doses-covid-19 (“Pfizer . . . and BioNTech . .
89
90
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1. Accelerated Vaccine Development Timeline
Given the inherent urgency to create a vaccine at the height of a
global pandemic, biotech companies fast–tracked and continue to
fast–track the development timeline. 99 Typically, clinical development of vaccines occurs in three phases. 100 This process is sequential and contingent upon the results of the previous phases. 101 However, companies have consolidated significant steps in the vaccine
development process by simultaneously performing different phases
of clinical trials. 102 Since the development of the COVID–19 vaccine was grounded in novel technology that had not formed the basis
for previous vaccines, 103 its accelerated timeline raised concerns
over the effectiveness and safety of COVID–19 vaccines. 104
2. Bayh–Dole Act of 1980
Moreover, the accelerated development of a COVID–19 vaccine
continues to raise multiple legal concerns. 105 One such issue may
arise if a company were to secure a patent so that it is the exclusive
producer of the COVID–19 vaccine. 106 In this situation, the federal
government could theoretically invoke the power of eminent domain
to grant other manufacturers the right to produce the vaccine. 107 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1498, in cases where the federal government
. announced plans to provide the U.S. government . . . 500 million doses of the
companies’ COVID–19 vaccine . . . .”).
99
Jonathan Gardner, Ned Pagliarulo, Shoshana Dubnow & Ben Fidler, Coronavirus vaccines are rolling out quickly. Here’s where the pipeline stands.,
BIOPHARMA DIVE, https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/coronavirus-vaccinepipeline-types/579122/ (last updated Oct. 1, 2021).
100
Vaccine Testing and the Approval Process, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/basics/test-approve.html (last
updated May 1, 2014).
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uses or manufactures a patent without the owner’s license, “the
owner’s remedy shall be by action against the U.S. . . . for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and
manufacture.” 108 Congress passed the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 for
this specific purpose. 109 This act provides for patents on inventions
to be exclusively licensed if they were supplemented by federal
funding. 110 Because the majority of vaccine manufacturers have accepted federal aid in developing potential vaccines, they are accordingly subject to the federal government’s eminent domain powers
authorized by the Bayh–Dole Act. 111
Specifically, the Act allows the government to “march–in” and
grant licenses to other actors in particular circumstances. 112 According to 35 U.S.C. § 203, the government may exercise its march–in
rights if it determines that “action is necessary to alleviate health or
safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the contractor,
assignee, or their licensees.” 113 This approach is unlikely given the
fact that the federal government has never exercised its march–in
rights on a patent in the history of the Bayh–Dole Act. 114 Nevertheless, the emergence of an unprecedented global health crisis may
cause the government to consider exercising this power. 115 The U.S.
government would likely invoke this power if a pharmaceutical
company failed to make the COVID–19 vaccine available “on reasonable terms.” 116
One example of failing to adhere to the clause “on reasonable
terms” includes setting prohibitively high prices for products, which
is not an atypical practice in the pharmaceutical industry. Normally,
pharmaceutical companies offer their products at steep prices to
28 U.S.C. § 1498 (2011).
Michael Liu, William B. Feldman, Jerry Avorn & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
March–In Rights And Compulsory Licensing – Safety Nets For Access To A
COVID–19 Vaccine, HEALTH AFFAIRS (May 6, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200501.798711/full/.
110
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John R. Thomas, March–In Rights Under the Bayh–Dole Act, CONG. RSCH.
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recoup the significant investment in researching, developing, and
manufacturing their product. 117 However, because the government
provided billions in federal funding to U.S.–based companies working towards developing vaccine candidates as part of Operation
Warp Speed, these companies were able to assume less financial risk
throughout the process. 118 As such, concerns over profit margins
were mitigated by the government’s research grants. 119 From a domestic perspective, U.S. pharmaceutical companies do not offer the
vaccinations to the consumer directly, as the government controls
allocation. 120 Additionally, because the vaccine doses were funded
and purchased by U.S. taxpayer dollars, vaccine providers offer vaccinations to U.S. residents free of charge. 121 The federal government, as a result, is less inclined to exercise its “march in” rights
because the government controls the distribution process. 122
B.
Contracts Between Canada and U.S. Pharmaceutical
Companies
The U.S. plays a fundamental role in vaccine development, as
the U.S. market constitutes 60% of vaccine–related profits worldwide. 123 U.S. companies have previously made agreements with foreign countries to supply vaccine doses. 124 For instance, in 2019, the
Canadian government executed an agreement with Seqirus, a U.S.
vaccine company, as a secondary influenza vaccine supplier in the
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case of a flu outbreak. 125 In a typical year, the Canadian government
would notify one of its routine influenza vaccine suppliers and place
an order depending on demand. 126 The primary difference between
previous APAs and COVID–19 vaccine APAs is that Canada had
contracts in place for previous flu outbreaks, whereas now the country has had to negotiate with multiple nations to secure APAs over
the course of the pandemic. 127
Canada’s practice of executing APAs with several vaccine manufacturers in an attempt to secure future vaccine doses, with the total
count at roughly five vaccines per Canadian, has raised the issue of
“vaccine nationalism.” 128 This trend of purchasing large batches of
vaccines prior to their development has drawn criticism from lower
and middle–income countries as coming into conflict with a more
coordinated global strategy. 129 However, the issue of vaccine nationalism raised by APAs for future vaccine doses is not new. 130 Often, vaccines developed by U.S. companies and other companies
based in developed nations are too costly for developing countries
to afford. 131 This trend is due in part to the expensive and time–consuming process of vaccine development. 132 For example, the research, development, and distribution of a novel vaccine may
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require over ten years of commitment and hundreds of millions of
dollars. 133
The Canadian government and multiple U.S. pharmaceutical
companies executed agreements for future COVID–19 vaccine
doses. 134 The Canadian government, advised by the Public Services
and Procurement Canada (“PSPC”), the Public Health Agency of
Canada (“PHAC”), Health Canada and Innovation, and Science and
Economic Development Canada, has since invested more than $9
billion in securing APAs with various vaccine manufacturers. 135
More specifically, Canada executed contracts with the following
companies: Novavax for 76 million doses, Johnson & Johnson for
38 million doses, Moderna for 56 million doses, and Pfizer for a
minimum of 20 million doses. 136 These agreements, which were
contingent upon successful completion of clinical trials and a license
from Health Canada, provided for the delivery of doses in early
2021. 137
Canada and Novavax reached an agreement whereby Canada
would receive 76 million doses of Novavax’s potential COVID–19
vaccine pending approval from Health Canada, the agency responsible for federal health policy. 138 Although the financial terms of the
agreement have yet to be disclosed, the Canadian government is
likely paying a substantial premium relative to that of the U.S. government. 139 Canada will likely have to pay a higher price due to its
hands–off approach in the research and development, manufacturing, and distribution phases, relative to that of the U.S. 140 Nonetheless, the Canadian government executed a similar agreement with
Id.
Wency Leung & Kelly Grant, Ottawa signs COVID–19 vaccine deals with
two U.S. companies, GLOB. & MAIL (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-ottawa-signs-covid-19-vaccine-deals- with-two-uscompanies/.
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another U.S.–based pharmaceutical company, Johnson & Johnson,
for 38 million doses of a future COVID–19 vaccine. 141 Neither party
has disclosed the financial terms of the agreement in principle,
which was contingent upon the vaccine candidate’s safety and efficacy and subject to Health Canada’s approval. 142 Nor have the financial terms of Canada’s agreement with Moderna for 56 million
doses been disclosed. 143
Lastly, Pfizer and the Canadian government reached an agreement in principle for 20 million doses of Pfizer’s vaccine candidate,
with the option in January 2021 to purchase 20 million additional
doses. 144 The distribution of the vaccine is subject to regulatory approval and was realized in December 2020. 145 Nevertheless, the Canadian government has been outspoken in its criticism towards
Pfizer’s vaccine distribution process. 146 According to the Ontario
Premier Doug Ford, Pfizer has delayed its vaccine deliveries to Canada to increase production in its Belgian plant, which provides vaccine deliveries outside the U.S. 147
The delay in vaccine distribution not only affects the amount of
people who can receive vaccinations, but also the precise period of
time in which high–risk candidates are expecting to receive both
Johnson & Johnson Announces Agreement in Principle with Government of
Canada to Supply its COVID–19 Vaccine Candidate, JOHNSON & JOHNSON
(Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.jnj.com/johnson-johnson-announces-agreementin-principle-with-government-of-canada-to-supply-its-covid19-vaccine-candidate.
142
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doses. 148 The U.S. government’s agreement with Pfizer stipulates
that all vaccines produced in the Michigan facility are to be distributed in the U.S. 149 Pursuant to the Canadian government’s contract
with Pfizer, Canada’s doses are to be delivered from Pfizer’s factory
in Belgium. 150 Canada has reached out to the U.S. government in an
attempt to secure doses from the Pfizer facility in Michigan, although Pfizer is not permitted to provide Canada with vaccines from
the U.S. facility. 151 Canada eventually received vaccine doses from
Pfizer pursuant to the vaccine contract. 152
IV.

POTENTIAL ETHICAL ISSUES RAISED BY VACCINE
AGREEMENTS

A.

Vaccine Nationalism
Throughout all global pandemics, wealthier nations have traditionally negotiated contracts with vaccine manufacturers to secure
doses for their citizens. 153 In 2009, at the height of the Swine Flu
pandemic, wealthy countries entered into APAs with vaccine manufacturers to secure doses of the newly–developed vaccine. 154 As a
result, developed countries, including the U.S., were able to reserve
bulk orders of vaccine doses through APAs while poorer countries
had fewer opportunities to do so. 155 The use of bilateral APAs was
so prevalent during the H1N1 pandemic “that more than 56% of
pandemic influenza manufacturers surveyed by WHO were unable
to commit to guaranteeing 10% of real–time vaccine production for
purchase by UN agencies due to pre–existing commitments under
APAs with HICs [high–income countries].” 156 This trend led to an
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inequitable distribution of swine flu vaccines among developed and
developing countries, rooted primarily in purchasing power as opposed to public health risk and need. 157
Moreover, Canada has implemented a process of securing contracts with vaccine manufacturers while demand is low in order to
ensure that the country has access to vaccines in the event of a public
health emergency. 158 During the H1N1 pandemic, Canada’s public
health response proved to be effective: the PHAC noted that “Canada’s preparedness allowed it to have one of the highest H1N1 immunization rates in the world.” 159 Following the H1N1 pandemic,
the PHAC published a report on which actions helped Canada to
counter the health emergency. 160 Of the four key activities listed,
two were based on the existence of vaccine contracts: “[m]anaging
a contract with a domestic manufacturer to develop a vaccine” and
“arranging a contract with Public Works and Government Services
Canada (now Public Services and Procurement Canada) for the purchase of sufficient vaccines for Canadians on behalf of the provinces
and territories.” 161 This strategy, however, is only beneficial during
an influenza pandemic, as vaccine manufacturers that have negotiated with Canada are solely required to supply influenza vaccines. 162
Specifically, these agreements are restricted to influenza vaccines,
so the Canadian government would have to renegotiate the terms of
the agreements to include COVID–19 vaccines. 163 These types of
agreements with vaccine manufacturers do not anticipate a non–influenza pandemic, and thus left Canada searching for new vaccine
contracts with other manufacturers amidst a public health emergency. 164 Given Canada’s lack of production and supply chain capacity, the country was forced to enter into agreements with other
nations to ensure its residents receive vaccinations. 165
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1. Disparity Between Wealthy and Non–Wealthy Nations
The People’s Vaccine Alliance released a report in December of
2020 which pointed to the fact that wealthy nations making up 14%
of the world’s population had already pre–purchased over 50% of
potential COVID–19 vaccines worldwide. 166 Similar reports have
estimated that Canada has been pre–purchasing vaccines in excess,
with as many as five vaccines per person. 167 On the other hand, in
low and middle–income countries, including Brazil and Indonesia,
the ratio of pre–purchased vaccines to people is roughly one vaccine
to every fourth person. 168 The U.S., for example, has set aside 800
million doses despite only having a population of roughly 330 million people. 169 Similarly, Japan, Australia, and Canada pre–purchased a combined one billion vaccine doses even though these
three nations make up less than 1% of current COVID–19 cases
globally. 170 These trends demonstrate that vaccines are being over–
purchased with respect to total population and COVID–19 case
count. 171 To illustrate the disparity between developing and developed nations, high and middle–income countries have received
more than 80% of doses worldwide, while only 1% of people in
low–income countries have received at least on dose. 172 The practice
of bidding for bilateral agreements artificially has raised the purchase price for vaccine doses, which in turn has negatively impacted
non–wealthy countries that do not have comparable financial resources. 173
William A. Haseltine, Billions in Low–Income Nations Will Not Receive
Their Covid–19 Vaccine Anytime Soon, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2021),
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2. Inequitable Distribution and Opportunity
The vaccine nationalism approach of U.S. manufacturers entering into APAs with wealthy countries has, and will likely continue
to, lead to an inefficient distribution of vaccine doses, providing
more opportunity for lower–risk individuals in wealthier countries
as opposed to higher–risk individuals in developing countries. 174
Developing nations have not possessed the requisite infrastructure
and technology found in more developed nations to carry out the
entire vaccine cycle, from manufacturing to distribution. 175 In contrast to developing nations, high–income countries have increased
access to vaccine doses because of the sophisticated infrastructure
needed to distribute and preserve them. 176 For example, many vaccines must be shipped in climate–controlled containers and stored in
cold temperatures. 177 But low and middle–income countries, even
those that are able to secure vaccine doses independently or with
assistance, do not have the infrastructure to meet these requirements
to ensure the vaccine doses remain effective. 178 Without a concerted
approach among countries, there is a higher likelihood that vaccine
supply chains will stall and not reach their maximum potential. 179
To date, vaccine manufacturing capacities remain below the level
needed to meet demand, with only several nations being able to produce vaccines. 180
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B.
Manufacturers’ Limited Liability Under the Public
Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act
1. Background
Other ethical concerns arise throughout the process of vaccine
development. 181 In an effort to expedite the development of a vaccine, the HHS will likely limit liability for manufacturers under the
PREP Act. 182 The PREP Act was passed in 2005, as Public Law
109–148, Division C, Section 2, under the Bush administration to
manage public health emergencies by safeguarding vaccine manufacturers from incurring most forms of liability, thereby incentivizing manufacturers to produce a vaccine as quickly as possible. 183 In
order to invoke the PREP Act, the Secretary of HHS “must determine that a disease or other threat to health constitutes a public
health emergency, or that there is a credible risk of such an emergency.” 184 The Secretary is required to publish the PREP Act declaration in the Federal Register and “identify, for each countermeasure, the particular disease, time period, population, and geographical
area that the declaration covers.” As long as the COVID–19 PREP
Act Declaration is in effect, vaccine manufacturers, distributors, and
health care providers are mostly immune from legal liability for
losses stemming from the vaccine. 185
2. Purpose
The PREP Act was passed to widen the scope of immunity from
liability for covered persons. 186 Pursuant to this Act, “covered persons—including COVID–19 vaccine developers, manufacturers,
[and] distributors . . . are generally immune from legal liability for
losses relating to administration or use of an FDA–approved
COVID–19 vaccine.” 187 If a covered person falls within the scope
of immunity, the PREP Act immunizes a covered person from legal
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liability for all claims for loss relating to the administration. 188 The
requirements for PREP act immunity are as follows: “(1) the individual or entity must be a ‘covered person,’ (2) the legal claim must
be for a ‘loss,’ (3) the loss must have a ‘causal relationship’ to the
administration or use of a covered countermeasure, and (4) the medical product that caused the loss must be a ‘covered countermeasure.’” 189
However, individuals may seek recourse for damages sustained
as a result of willful misconduct leading to death or serious injury. 190
Under these circumstances, an individual may pursue damages
through the Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program
(“CICP”), a mechanism overseen by the HHS. 191 The CICP provides an exception to the liability immunity for covered persons:
“[a]n individual seriously injured or killed by the administration of
a covered countermeasure, whether or not as a result of willful misconduct, may seek compensation through CICP.” 192 This program
is funded by Congress via emergency appropriations to the Covered
Countermeasure Process Fund. 193 Although the CICP offers remedies for individuals who suffer damages as a result of a COVID–19
vaccine, the program is independent of the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program (“VICP”). 194 The VICP provides remedies
for injuries caused by routine vaccines in the U.S., while the CICP
exclusively applies to vaccines covered by a PREP Act declaration
of a public health emergency, such as the COVID–19 pandemic, influenza pandemic, and the Ebola virus. 195
Canada, on the other hand, has yet to declare a federal act related
to the COVID–19 pandemic. 196 Similar to the federalism framework
in the U.S., each province in Canada retains power independent
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from that of the federal government. 197 As such, the federal government of Canada would be required to collaborate with the individual
provinces in crafting an emergency response to the effects of the
pandemic, pursuant to the 2007 Emergency Management Act. 198
However, if the federal government declared a national emergency,
it could theoretically implement an emergency response for the entire nation without having to coordinate with the provinces. 199 This
piece of legislation, The Emergencies Act of 1985, grants the federal
government unilateral power to implement a public health strategy,
acting as a last resort in a public health crisis. 200 However, Canada
has never declared a national public health emergency in its history. 201 As a result, the federal emergency declarations have never
been tested and the efficacy of both acts remains unknown. 202
Moreover, the Canadian government does not have an urgent
need to implement emergency acts limiting legal liability for vaccine manufacturers, vaccine developers, and others involved in the
administration of a potential vaccine due to the lack of domestic vaccine development, production, and distribution. 203 The Canadian
government has primarily been entering into APAs with foreign
vaccine manufacturers as opposed to funding the vaccine development process domestically. 204 While numerous countries around the
world raced to develop the first successful COVID–19 vaccine, Canada was unable to compete in vaccine production––an issue dating
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back decades. 205 The Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau, explained that the nation does not possess sufficient supply chain capability to mass produce a COVID–19 vaccine, even if one could
have been produced domestically. 206 According to Earl Brown, an
infectious disease expert and former member of the swine flu vaccine task group in Canada, “[w]e had great vaccine producers in
Canada– world leaders essentially– 50 years ago.” 207 Canadian
manufacturers, including Connaught Laboratories in Toronto and
Institut Armand Frappier in Montreal, were known producers of insulin, inoculants, and vaccines. 208 However, these companies were
unable to generate enough profit to remain competitive and were
eventually absorbed by or sold to foreign companies. 209
Although some Canadian companies, such as Medicago in Quebec and VIDO–InterVac in Saskatchewan, have been progressing
towards developing a successful vaccine candidate, these companies
would be unable to mass produce vaccines at a level to supply all
Canadians. 210 Looking to the future, Canadian pharmaceutical companies intend to develop supply chains that would produce vaccines
regularly to anticipate future public health emergencies. 211 One
company, VIDO–InterVac, plans to construct a facility to manufacture vaccines, but the process will take time. 212 For the foreseeable
future, Canada will be forced to rely on foreign vaccine manufacturers to obtain vaccine doses. 213 Canada has received vaccines from
U.S. manufacturers, specifically Johnson & Johnson, Moderna, and
Pfizer, over the course of 2021. 214 As of October 2021, nearly 75%
of the population is fully vaccinated. 215
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GLOBAL PANDEMIC RESPONSE

A.

Effect of Bilateral APAs
Many wealthy nations began entering into bilateral APAs with
manufacturers as the pandemic grew worse. 216 Countries with significant financial resources had the opportunity to secure vaccine
doses before the vaccines were even developed. 217 While bilateral
agreements may be beneficial in the short term, they fail to address
the larger issue of global herd immunity. 218 Even if the nation that
executed the bilateral APA were to achieve herd immunity domestically, the rest of the world would lag behind, potentially posing
lasting public health problems. 219 This process may have a significant negative impact on affected countries’ relations moving forward. 220
However, bilateral APAs yield significant advantages. 221
The inherent competition among vaccine manufacturers to produce
the first successful COVID–19 vaccine has driven innovation and
has likely altered the vaccine development process for the better
moving forward. 222 Typically, the timeline for vaccine development, ranging from research through distribution, is nearly six
years. 223 Given the urgency and increased demand for a vaccine,
pharmaceutical companies have sought to complete development
within a fraction of that time. 224 This unprecedented and accelerated
method may provide the blueprint to produce a safe and effective
vaccine in future public health emergencies. 225 Proponents of APAs
argue that the far–reaching benefits of producing a successful
Price et al., supra note 59.
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vaccine outweigh the costs of funding multiple pharmaceutical companies and the risk of several vaccine candidates failing. 226
1. Impact on Global Pandemic
Without a continued collaborative approach, the timeframe of
the COVID–19 pandemic will continue to extend, leading to higher
economic costs and public health concerns. 227 We now know that
the lack of access to a COVID–19 vaccine worldwide hindered the
global economy, particularly high–contact industries including tourism, health care, and retail. 228 One study shows the effect on global
GDP in the absence of worldwide access to effective vaccines that
would permit high–contact sectors to return to normal levels of activity. 229 This report indicated that roughly $3.4 trillion in global
GDP may be lost per year, even when operating under the assumption that countries will not revert back to home confinement and
lockdown measures. 230 Although bilateral agreements may improve
a nation’s public health and economic outlook, they have minimal
impact on the duration of a global pandemic. 231 In order to return to
a sense of normalcy, ‘herd immunity’ will need to be realized. 232
This phenomenon refers to “the indirect protection from an infectious disease that happens when a population is immune either
through vaccination or immunity developed through previous infection.” However, according to the WHO, herd immunity should only
be achieved through vaccination due to the potential negative health
Id.
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effects of infection. 233 The most effective way to vaccinate a significant proportion of the world’s population, as we have seen, is
through a concerted, global effort to provide equitable vaccine access. 234
B.

Potential Alternatives
Global health entities can nonetheless continue to execute APAs
to obtain vaccine doses for developing countries and other countries
that do not have equitable access to newly–developed vaccines. 235
This process can occur through an Advanced Market Commitment
(“AMC”) model, where donors pledge to fund the purchase of a potential vaccine intended for developing countries that are unable to
front the cost. 236 For example, in 2007, five countries along with the
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation pledged $1.5 billion to create the
first AMC. 237 Through this initiative, the AMC was able to secure
pneumococcal vaccines for low and middle–income nations in
need. 238 In June 2021, multiple countries pledged roughly $2.4 billion in vaccine doses at an AMC. 239
1. Advanced Market Commitment Models (AMCs)
i.
Gavi: The Vaccine Alliance
Other models have proven to be effective in committing funds
to obtain vaccine doses for developing countries, including the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (“IFFlm”). 240 This
Id.
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organization raises funds for vaccines through the use of bonds and
is part of The Vaccine Alliance (“Gavi”), 241 Gavi has partnered with
other organizations including the WHO, UNICEF, the World Bank,
and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, with the goal of increasing equitable access to vaccines worldwide. 242 Gavi was founded in
2000 and serves as a conduit between vaccine manufacturers and
developing countries that otherwise would not be able to afford
high–priced vaccines. 243 Through this model, Gavi has been able to
vaccinate nearly half of the children worldwide. 244 Gavi’s proven
track record in obtaining vaccines for low and middle–income countries has provided the alliance significant bargaining power when
dealing with vaccine manufacturers. 245 For example, in the U.S., the
estimated overall cost to vaccinate a child with the eleven WHO–
recommended vaccines is $1,100 per child. 246 However, in countries
supported by Gavi, the total cost of providing the same vaccines is
$28. 247
ii.
COVAX
COVAX is one of the three components of the Access to
COVID–19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, which was launched in April
of 2020 by the WHO, the European Commission, and France to
counter the COVID–19 pandemic. 248 COVAX links governments,
global health organizations, vaccine manufacturers, scientists, the
private sector, civil society, and philanthropists with the ultimate
goal of ensuring equitable access to COVID–19 vaccines, diagnostics, and treatments. 249 Additionally, COVAX is coordinated by
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (“CEPI”), and the WHO, and intends to reach its
objectives by backing the research, development, and
Id.
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manufacturing of vaccine candidates and negotiating purchase
prices. 250 Without this “lifeline,” many lower and middle–income
countries that are unable to execute APAs and independently purchase vaccine doses would be plagued by this virus indefinitely.251
This solution offers all participating nations––regardless of wealth–
–a unique symbiotic relationship: “it . . . provide[s] direct protection
by increasing their chances of securing vaccine doses . . . . [y]et, at
the same time by procuring COVID–19 vaccines through COVAX,
these nations will also indirectly protect their citizens by reducing
the chances of resurgence by ensuring that the rest of the world gets
access to doses too.” 252
The objective of this initiative is to have two billion vaccine
doses accessible by the end of 2021, primarily for frontline
healthcare workers and high–risk populations. 253 By creating a
global, collaborative vaccine network, low and middle–income
countries, who would not have been able to front the cost for APAs,
can now obtain vaccine doses for their residents. 254 As part of the
initiative, the first deliveries of vaccine doses are expected to go to
lower–income nations who are unable to execute APAs with vaccine
manufacturers. 255 Moreover, even countries that have APAs in place
would still benefit from COVAX in the event that they are unable to
secure enough doses from the manufacturers. 256 As such, both developed and developing countries have an incentive to join the collaboration and help coordinate a global pandemic response. 257
Another aspect of COVAX is the Gavi COVAX AMC,
which was launched to ensure that the ninety two lower and middle–
income countries lacking the financial resources to independently
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afford COVID–19 vaccines would be able to gain the same access
to vaccines as higher–income countries. 258 Although lower and middle–income countries can participate in the general COVAX program, COVAX AMC is an independent branch which keeps the
funds raised by self–financing participants separate from funds
raised through Official Development Assistance (“ODA”), philanthropy, and the private sector. 259
However, numerous criticisms have been raised about
COVAX and its methods. 260 Critics point to COVAX’s practice of
negotiating prices for lower and middle–income countries that
bake–in profits as opposed to providing the vaccines at cost. 261 Further, COVAX has been criticized for not divulging the specific
terms of agreements executed with vaccine manufacturers, along
with not reconciling intellectual property issues related to the
newly–developed vaccines. 262 Certain nations in the European Union claimed that APAs are more efficient and cost–effective than the
COVAX method, and opted out of utilizing the COVAX facility to
purchase vaccine doses. 263 Nevertheless, in the summer of 2020, the
European Union pledged 400 million dollars to COVAX to collaborate in the future and secure vaccines for lower and middle–income
countries. 264
Despite attempts to withdraw from the WHO in July 2020, the
U.S. recently reaffirmed its commitment to remaining in the organization. 265 As part of the announcement to continue as a member of
the WHO, President Biden’s chief medical adviser, Anthony Fauci,
also confirmed that the U.S. will join the COVAX initiative to
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facilitate the delivery of vaccine doses to lower–income countries. 266 In echoing the support of a coordinated, global response to
the pandemic, Britain’s ambassador to the UN, Julian Braithwaite,
“welcome[d] the decision by the U.S. to join the COVAX facility,
because vaccinating our own populations is not enough scientifically or morally.” 267
Canada, which has secured a stockpile of potential vaccine
doses through its multiple APAs, recently committed 75 million Canadian dollars in funding for the delivery of COVID–19 vaccines to
lower–income nations. 268 Moreover, Canada announced an additional investment of five million Canadian dollars towards the equitable reallocation of COVID–19 vaccines that are processed through
the COVAX facility. 269
VI.
CONCLUSION
In order to effectively counter the impact of a worldwide pandemic, countries should continue their global response. 270 The
COVID–19 Law Lab, which collects and makes available legal documents and frameworks from over 190 countries worldwide, is a
promising start. 271 The objective of this initiative is to provide access to any country seeking to improve its existing legal framework
in order to keep the pandemic under control. 272 As part of this collaboration, countries can mimic aspects from other countries’ public
health strategies and implement effective laws to “help build strong
health systems; evaluate and approve safe and effective drugs and
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vaccines; advance human rights; and enforce actions to create
healthier and safer public spaces and workplaces.” 273
Another component to a coordinated pandemic response is
providing equitable vaccine access to participating nations through
a global vaccine network. 274 Although bilateral agreements are beneficial for the participating nations, they do not properly address the
overarching goal of achieving herd immunity. 275 But regardless of
whether the nation realizes herd immunity on a domestic level, it
may still be vulnerable to negative health impacts caused by other
countries’ lack of equitable vaccine access. 276 So if countries commit to participating in a concerted effort to obtain vaccines for as
many countries as possible, it will likely shorten the time frame of
the pandemic, and reduce economic and health costs. 277
COVAX, launched by Gavi, helps create equitable access to
COVID–19 vaccines. 278 This initiative provides a “lifeline” to lower
and middle–income countries that lack the financial resources to enter into APAs with manufacturers 279 by affording all participating
countries the opportunity to obtain effective vaccine doses at reduced costs. 280 Thus, we can see that the benefits of the global vaccine network that has been created over the past two years are twofold: nations may directly protect their citizens through an increased
likelihood of securing vaccine doses while indirectly countering the
effects of the pandemic on a global level, as increased vaccine access will gradually lead to herd immunity. 281
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